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Abstract: Currently, niqabi women are more and more visible, even in traditionally non-Muslim
societies. However, there is a deep ignorance with regard to their worldview in general and about
them in particular. The aim of this paper, which is based on a research carried out using the
Grounded Theory, is to give answer to three fundamental questions: did niqabi women belonging
to the Telegram channel Orgullo niqabi choose to become niqabis after experiencing some kind
of crisis or existential unease? Has the grouping of these women in said channel contributed to
the polarization of their posture on the niqab in some way? Additionally, if that is the case, has
said polarization fueled or given rise to some ideology in particular? One of our conclusions, after
conducting 27 in-depth interviews, is that most of these women opted for being niqabi and Muslim
in response to the existential unease they experienced, which somehow kept them searching for
some meaning in their lives. Another interesting aspect we have observed is that these women
have reinforced their posture on the niqab, polarizing their perception in a fundamentalist way.
Additionally, our third conclusion is that these women are cyber-fundamentalists, given that, besides
the reactionary nature of their ideology, they construct it in a modern way.
Keywords: anomie; cyber fundamentalism; existential unease; fundamentalism; niqabi; polarization
1. Introduction
Two of the main characteristics of our time are the so called “cyber-world” [1–3]
and individualism [4–6]. The “cyber-world”, originated by new technologies, refers to
the non-space where more and more significant events, both individual and collective,
take place, greatly modifying the life of individuals as well as the essence of their bonds.
Individualism is linked to a change of habits, costumes and social organization, with
personal values tending to be focused on introspection and self-concern, and being in a
constant search of sense in a mostly secular environment [7] ruled by consumerism [8,9],
market ethics [10] and disenchantment with all institutions, including religious ones [11].
In this environment, where the seeds of the slogan “God is dead” [12] (p. 147) and the end
of ideologies [13] lay, has left the individual in a perpetual state of provisionality, search
and existential suspension [14].
All of this leads to a scenario of great disenchantment as a result of the fall of many
great meta-narratives that stood out as principles and grounding basis for us to think
and name our world [15]. According to Florence Beauge [16], in this context where
personal responsibility prevails, we as individuals are constantly doomed to “choose” our
own values, with all the consequences, difficulties and doubts that this entails. Samuel
Huntington [17] (p. 116) points to fundamentalist movements as a possible response to this
context and a way to confront chaos and the loss of identity, meaning, and strong social
structures. According to him, these circumstances have been originated by the scientific
culture, laicism, economic development, and the hasty introduction of modern political
and social models.
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From this point of view, Kepel [18] says that fundamentalism has to be seen not only
as a result of unreason and fanaticism, but as proof of a great social disease which our
traditional categories of thinking cannot fully describe. As individuals, we feel the need
to give definite answers, above anything else, to questions such as “who am I” or “where
do I belong” [17] (p. 15). To this respect, Hobsbawm and Belrán [19] (p. 45) point to
social changes and a constant climate of insecurity in every aspect of life, and the unease
associated to them, as essential characteristics of our time. More specifically, they argue that
current fear of “the tomorrow” being different to “the yesterday,” along with the urge to
gain permanent values of “fundamental” characteristics, are acquiring great psychological
significance not only for individuals, but also—and even more—for the community.
Moreover, in that scenario of constant changes, one of them is especially relevant: the
transition from a completely analogical reality to a hybrid one. In this hybrid reality, offline
and online activities coexist in some sort of symbiosis that facilitates the emergence of new
communication channels which we could not imagine until now, as well as new ways
of being, interacting, and interpreting the world [2]. This has brought more uncertainty
and unease but, somewhat paradoxically and ambivalently, technology has also presented
before us new “doors” and tools which help us find some answers to calm that existential
unease and end, for some time at least, the search for meaning that some individuals
undertake. An example of that would be “cyber-religions” [20] or all the new online
movements linked to faith, such as those related to the “New Age” [21].
In this context, composed of the people inhabiting the “non-space”, Rheingold [22]
(p. 18) points to the existence of what he calls smartmobs—collectives of people which unite,
group together, create communities, deconstruct identities and even act jointly without
knowing each other personally. According to him, members of this groups cooperate
in ways that would be inconceivable in the past because they make use of advanced
information and telecommunication systems which allow them to connect to other systems
from their environment, even to phones and computers from strangers.
According to Cass Sunstein [23], these communities formed around common interests
present something that the theorist calls “group polarization”: the members of a deliberative
group are likely to lean towards the extreme position close to their pre-deliberative tendencies.
One of the main research questions of the present paper revolves around this theory.
As one can see, we are talking about research questions, not research hypotheses, given
that we have carried out our research making use of the Grounded Theory. Said theory
utilizes the inductive method to discover theories, concepts, hypotheses and propositions.
Although it is true that we did not start directly from previous data or assumptions, it is
also true that we have made use of some theoretical assumptions which have helped us to
focus our research. We have used some analytical categories as a first approach to the data
we had obtained, while we were open to possible new categories that could emerge from
the final analysis of said data thanks to the application of the Grounded Theory.
The questions in which we base our research are the following: First, we want to find
out the reasons why the niqabi women belonging to the Telegram channel Orgullo niqabi
(Spanish for “Niqabi Pride”) became niqabi and if the search for existential meaning had
something to do to this respect. Second, we want to know if the grouping of these women
in said channel has contributed in some way to the polarization of their posture on the
niqab. Additionally, third, we want to find out if this possible polarization has motivated
or given rise to some ideology in particular.
Regarding the private channel Orgullo niqabi on Telegram it is worth noting that its
central theme are niqabi and Muslim subjects, the demands of their members as Muslim
women in general, and as niqabi in particular.
For us, there are two requirements that must be fulfilled so that we can consider
someone a niqabi woman: she defines herself as niqabi, and she covers her whole face
and body, including hands and feet and excluding just the eyes. However, in order to
fully understand what being niqabi means in the context of our research, we must say that
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these women associate the niqab not only to the clothing, but also to the way of being and
behaving in this world, tied to and coherent with their interpretation of Islam [24].
Thus, wearing a niqab does not necessarily mean being niqabi, since in theocracies
such as that in Saudi Arabia women are forced to cover themselves with a niqab or
a burka, no matter what they want [25]. Those women have not chosen to be niqabi
Muslims. Additionally, there are plenty of cases that do not adjust to our definition, such
as those of some Muslim countries where women are wearing niqab or burka because
the government is promoting its use as a low-cost alternative to the masks used to fight
COVID-19 [26]. Moreover, some women associate niqab with fashion, and there are even
some Instagram “influencers” which wear it and promote its use as a fashion product, more
than as something with religious interpretations—although in some cases both motivations
are not mutually exclusive, apparently [27,28]. What we want to make clear is that niqabi
woman and niqab-wearing woman are not the same, and that both categories represent
very different realities [29–33]. As an example, and putting the focus only on a country, as
we said before, there are women in Saudi Arabia that are forced to wear niqab, but there are
also those who wear it voluntarily and make it a central element of their lifestyle [30,34,35].
It is worth noting that our research is focused on a very specific group of women—the
members of the aforementioned Telegram channel—thus, our objective is not to extrapolate
their reality to the rest of niqabi women or niqab-wearing women but to leave proof,
through the answers the women under study gave to our questions, of the diversity that
exists within the collective of covered women. Regarding Telegram, it is known for being
used for a great variety of purposes (leisure, publicity, etc.). However, in the case of Orgullo
niqabi, it is used as a subaltern space whose main feature is to give room to all kinds of
users, without discrimination; groups which are not a majority, or which are non-normative,
that is to say, subversive groups, and even groups of criminal or terrorist nature. More
specifically, Telegram channels are groups where people can send all kinds of contents:
messages, pictures, links, files, etc. Channels may be public or private: anyone can join a
public channel, whereas private channels can only be accessed if the creator of the group
adds you or sends you an invitation to join. Channels are usually built around subjects
and common interests shared by all of their users. A particularity of these channels is
that messages are encrypted and, in addition, they can be “destroyed” after a scheduled
time without leaving a trace. It is precisely this peculiarity of Telegram which made niqabi
women to choose this virtual space for creating their channel. On the one hand, it gives
them the opportunity to freely express their interests and opinions and, on the other hand,
whatever they say is kept private. That way, this space possess the double functionality of
subaltern spaces: it functions, on the one hand, as a safe place for retreating and regrouping
and, on the other hand, as the “headquarters” for planning and organizing a group’s
actions [2].
As for the conclusions of our study, we could confirm that a lot of interviewees,
especially the converts, arrive to Islam and to being niqabi after some time searching
for existential meaning, including coming into contact with other religions and forms of
spirituality, as well as having experienced strong personal crises. We could also confirm
that, after grouping together, their posture on Islam in general and on the niqab in particular
were polarized, reinforcing one another in their choice for the niqab and its meaning and
significance. Furthermore, one of the most important conclusions of the research is no
doubt that we can call these women cyber-fundamentalists.
If the prefix “cyber-” gives an excessively modern and specially contemporary nuance
to the concept, we will not have erred in our conclusions. This is so because both the
continent—the concept—and the content—its essence—are modern; not only these women,
but their ideology and the way they construct it, are modern.
This way, cyber-fundamentalism would present itself as another variant of fundamen-
talism that arises as a reaction, alternative and even a tool to live the context of modernity.
Regarding the concept of “fundamentalism”, we would like to point out that it has not
been free of controversy since the emergence of the term in The Fundamentals: a Testimony
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to Truth in United States between 1910 and 1915. This is so because it is a term that,
throughout history, has been attributed to several ideologies, movements and groups of
various kinds (religious, political, cultural and social groups). This term was born, as
we have said, with the aforementioned work, a collection of ninety articles written by
very conservative evangelical Protestant professors, writers and theologists who showed
their total opposition to the predominant modernism of that time, since they thought that
said modernism, along with liberalism, threatened the fundamental pillars of Christian
faith [18]. Later, this term began to be used to designate other movements and collectives,
being extrapolated—not without criticism—to refer, by analogy, to other religions or cur-
rents within them. Additionally, not only that: it also began to be used in other fields
outside the religious sphere.
As for cyber-fundamentalism, it can be defined as an ideology that emerges as an oppo-
sition to modernity and complies with the characteristics of fundamentalism given by some
authors—search for literal interpretation of texts, elimination of any type of alternative
interpretation of the texts, search for religion to spread to the public domain, etc. [36]. Fur-
thermore, it adds the peculiarity of being constructed in a specific non-space: cyberspace,
non-space par excellence and particularly characteristic of our time.
These women—whose life was clearly modern and characterized by having an open
purpose, changing, searching, being constructed—would not have achieved to sculpt
the specificity of their identity, as well as each and every one of its enclosures, without
said non-space.
Somehow, cyber-fundamentalism—dressed with Islamic clothing—has lifted from
these women the weight of freedom and creative energy to present themselves to the world.
In contrast, this has endowed them with a vital re-enchantment with the world, giving
them an apparently harmonic existence. The social price these women pay for having
found the elixir of a world full of certitude is to endure some type of social discrimination
and sometimes even being repudiated by their families. In addition, the personal price
is having to work to achieve a specific, given character coherent with the niqab, thus
renouncing to have one of their own.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Data-Analysis Method
The Grounded Theory, a general method of comparative analysis with great ability for
uniting theory and empirical research [37], was used for data analysis. This method offers
a series of procedures that serve to order the information and develop analytical categories
that reveal the most relevant patterns present within the data. We used the software Atlas
(v. Ti6) as a manager for the creation of different codes on which we applied the constant
comparative method—the search for similarities and differences through the analysis of the
incidents contained within the data [38]. Thus, we established three significant categories
which allow us to explain and respond to our research questions.
As for the procedure, it started with the creation of a first level of codification with
several substantive codes that offered us a descriptive explanation of the data we had
collected so far. After that, as these codes became saturated with data from new interviews,
some of those codes came to form the central categories—i.e., with greater explanatory
power—of our study. Thus, substantive codes such as unease, emptiness, depression
or search formed the category anomie; codes such as sisters, outjis (sisters), together or
ummah (community) formed the category cohesion; and codes such as practice, straight
path, channel or online formed the category cyber-fundamentalism.
As for the categories, the first one, anomie, is based on the sense of emptiness, de-
pression and existential crisis that the interviewees reported having experienced before
becoming niqabis. The second category, cohesion, represents the strong sense of union that
these women declare to have, both in terms of intra-group affective ties and in terms of
consonance and agreement in their opinions, feelings and arguments. Finally, the third
category is called cyber-fundamentalism because we consider that their decision to become
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niqabis responds to this type of ideology. These categories are what in Grounded Theory is
known as in vivo code, i.e., they are coded taking into account the expressions and literal
language of the participants, given their relevance for the study. Later, these categories
make the emergence of the theory possible.
2.2. Members of “Orgullo Niqabi” Who Participated in Our Research
About the participants, it should be noted that they declare themselves niqabis and
cover their face, body, hands and feet, leaving only their eyes uncovered. These women
link the niqab to a garment, but also to a way of behaving and being in the world, linked
to a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, in this case Sunni [39]. In the following table
(Table 1), we present some of the complementary information that we have mentioned in
the text or throughout the analysis. Significantly, many of these women—twelve of them,
to be precise—have declared during the interviews to have “turned to Islam”, i.e., they
are converts.
Table 1. Profiles of the niqabi women which were interviewed.
Name Age Residence Nationality Ties to Islam
Ahlam 25 France Algeria Family tradition
Amina 25 United Kingdom Spain Convert
Dunia 19 Spain Morocco Family tradition
Falak 19 United Kingdom Spain Convert
Farida 33 Venezuela Turkey Family tradition
Fatima 27 Chile Uruguay Convert
Fatin 35 Mexico Tunisia Family tradition
Hafida 33 United Kingdom Algeria Family tradition
Hakima 32 Romania Romania Convert
Hanna 35 Venezuela Turkey Family tradition
Ikram 41 United States Colombia Convert
Islam 28 Chile Chile Convert
Maria 35 Venezuela Morocco Family tradition
Melika 29 United Kingdom Morocco Family tradition
Mery 34 United Kingdom Iraq Family tradition
Meryem 31 United States Colombia Convert
Nour 36 United Kingdom Morocco Family tradition
Ratsida 26 United Kingdom Algeria Family tradition
Romina 27 Venezuela Venezuela Convert
Salima 28 France Algeria Family tradition
Samia 23 Germany Turkey Family tradition
Sara 34 Mexico Mexico Convert
Sofia 31 United States Spain Convert
Sonia 39 Mexico Mexico Convert
Souad 27 Mexico Mexico Convert
Yasmin 25 Venezuela Syria Family tradition
Zyneb 25 Spain Morocco Family tradition
2.3. Materials
This research is based on in-depth interviews. A total of 27 interviews to women
belonging to the Telegram channel Orgullo niqabi were conducted. All of them declared to be
niqabi or in the process of becoming one. The interviews were based on a semi-structured
script taking into account the various objectives of the research. Those we are specifically
concerned with in this article are the following: (1) To find out which are the reasons that
have led the niqabi women under study to become niqabis and whether the search for
existential meaning has had something to do with this issue, (2) To determine whether the
grouping of these women in the Orgullo niqabi channel has contributed to the polarization,
in some sense, of these women’s postures on the niqab, (3) To determine whether this
possible polarization has given rise to a particular ideology.
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As for the number of women, despite the fact that it may not seem a very significant
number a priori, the strength of this research lies in having gotten these women to partici-
pate in the study. It is not easy, first, to interact with groups of niqabi women, and second,
to get these women to agree to participate in any type of research. We would also like to
emphasize that this study is not intended to extrapolate results to other groups of niqabi or
niqab-wearing women, especially from other sociopolitical contexts, but to highlight the
particularity of this group, reflecting the discourse of the participants and capturing one of
the multiple realities that hide behind the niqab.
Regarding how these women were contacted, one of the researchers who sign this
article has actively participated in a lot of Spanish-speaking forums, groups, channels,
websites and social networks on Islamic issues for years, carrying out analyses of some of
them [39,40]. She has also carried out participant observation in different Islamic communi-
ties and associations [39], paying special attention to two major topics: the discrimination
suffered by Muslim women [40] and the processes of radicalization of said women [24].
In one of her many online interactions, she was offered the opportunity to be part
of the Orgullo niqabi channel. Needless to say, the researcher jumped at the opportunity
without a second thought. However, the easy access to the group was an achievement
that had nothing to do with the women agreeing to be part of the study. It was not easy
to gain their trust, necessary to conduct the interviews. In fact, the research was only
possible thanks to the creator of the community, who acted as a liaison between the other
women and the researcher by posting an announcement on the channel, inviting them to
participate in our study.
The participants set several conditions for participating in the study: their social
and political demands should be discussed in future publications—an issue addressed
in another article [41]—their speeches should not be manipulated, their identity should
stay secret—which is why we changed their names—and the treatment of the interviews
should be above all ethical, publishing only fragments of the interviews and not disclosing
personal issues that could have been addressed during the interviews, be it unconsciously
or due to the atmosphere of confidence.
The software Skype was used to conduct the interviews; on the one hand, because the
interviewees suggested it due to its ease of use; and on the other hand, because most of the
participants lived outside Spain—the place from where the research was conducted. Due
to these circumstances, the researchers adapted to the way in which the women wanted
to be interviewed as well as to their time availability. The interviews were carried out
over a period of 6 months, but the previous work of contacting the women, planning the
interviews and other aspects, took approximately a year and a half.
3. Results
This section contains some of the main analytical findings of our research, based on
the analysis of the interviews and linked to our object of study. These have been listed
according to the three significant categories that explain and answer the questions posed
in our research after applying the constant comparative method based on the search for
similarities and differences through the analysis of the incidents within our data [38]. Said
categories are called anomie, cohesion and cyber-fundamentalism.
Let us begin the analysis citing Beriain [42] (p. 1), who says that the concept of persona
comes from ancient times. It originated to refer to the mask worn by the performers, and
in it converge the intentions of the performer and the requirements and opinions from the
environment. Thus, according to Beriain, we are persons insofar as we wear masks that
“represent” us and through which we present ourselves to the world. That is the case of the
women under study: on the one hand, they have “chosen” the niqab and let it represent
them and, on the other hand, they represent a specific ideology—Islamic fundamentalism.
Said ideology turns to the precepts of the Quran and the teachings of its prophet, applies
them literally and follows them as a spiritual and behavioral guide, expecting religion to
spread to public domain [24]. In the following excerpt we can see how these women feel
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with respect to their choice on how to present themselves as persons and what they feel
they are representing being niqabis:
I feel complete. I feel good being niqabi; it gives me a sense of dignity. The
niqab is the representation of what I am, of what I believe in, of Allah’s command,
subhanahu wa ta’ala (may He be praised and exalted), and of our beloved Prophet
Muhammad’s precepts, sallallahu alayhi wa sallam (may Allah honor Him and
grant Him peace). I would not feel good and at ease walking the streets without
my niqab, because I am Muslim, both at home and outdoors; what’s more, I think
it’s my right, and I would get angry if I was forced to renounce to wear what I
want. It’s my freedom, my choice, the niqab represents me and, when I wear it, I
feel like I’m raising Islam’s flag up high (Ratsida).
In this context, with respect to the interviewee’s words “it’s my freedom, my choice,”
and according to Weber [43,44], we can say that religious beliefs have become a matter of
subjective choice as a result of the emergence of many and varied alternative interpretations
about the purpose and meaning of life. In the same vein, Melucci [45] affirms that “to
choose” is the unavoidable fate of our times, when the credibility of all institutions—even
religious ones—is falling apart. On this playing field, faith and its specific manifestations
are seen as an option among many other possible choices [46]. This can be seen in this
quote from one of the participants:
I have embraced a lot of religions and not a single one has satisfied me. Even less
the churches, the priests, it’s all a sham. Islam is my place. I couldn’t find myself
until I found The Truth, Islam (Ikram).
3.1. Anomie
If, as pointed out by our results, “to choose” is an unshakable fate we cannot avoid,
then what is behind our choices? Is it an unstoppable search of sense, maybe? This was
one of the main questions we asked ourselves before conducting the interviews, and that is
how we posed the question to the interviewees: “what drove you to choose to be niqabi or
to the niqab as a way of life?” It was vital for us to unravel what was behind that choice.
Additionally, all the answers they gave in this regard were associated to two main issues
which are in turn intrinsically related.
The first, more repeated one, had to do with the constant “search for meaning in
life” these women experienced “before turning to Islam.” The second type of answers was
associated to what some authors call “perceived marginality” [47], which has been a source
of frustration, unease and disenchantment for these women. Regarding the search for
meaning, we can see it in this intervention by Romina, which represents how these women
feel in general:
I used to go online, and I have always liked Moroccan food very much. I got to
know a Facebook channel about recipes for this type of food, and there were many
Muslim women there. We started talking about Islam and then a motivation that
I hadn’t known for years came to me. You have asked me how I felt before Islam,
and the truth is that I was depressed. Sad. I have always had many problems
with depression, many ups and downs, and it was turning to Islam and ending
it all. I have tried many things before Islam, everything to no avail. Now I
have joie de vivre, motivations, plans. I love being an ambassador for Allah,
subhanahu wa ta’ala, and for our beloved Prophet Mohammed, sallallahu alayhi
wa sallam (Romina).
In this last respect, Berger [48] (p. 113) pointed out that “ideals and morality are
the best means to fill the big hole that the one calls soul.” Weber [44] talked about the
“disenchantment of the world” associated to the eclipse and decline of sacred institutions,
and Simmel [49] pointed out that, throughout history, the lack of “something definitive”
at the center of life has driven individuals to seek momentary satisfaction in excitement,
elation, new activities, etc. Additionally, indeed, in the discourse of these women we find
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signs which lead us to affirm that they have suffered personally the uneasiness of this
profound disenchantment and that they have found “the meaning of life,” literally, in the
way in which they live Islam.
I was born into a Catholic family. It didn’t make me whole. Then, I went through
a time in which I felt I didn’t believe in anything, I think it had to do with being a
teenager and, well, I really don’t know how, but I ended up becoming a Jehovah’s
Witness. It worked for some time, but then I felt again that some things didn’t
fit me. I have told you before that my brother was a pothead, but I was also a
quite a junkie for some time, to say the least. Druggie, drug-addict. I was a lost
cause. Totally lost, astaghfirullah (I seek forgiveness from Allah). Life had no
meaning to me. I just wanted to party, party and party, and I consumed and
consumed, naturally. I robbed my parents, I even shook and pushed my mother
around because she refused to give me money. I am ashamed to tell this, but I
do it for Allah, because if someone reads what you are going to publish I want
them to know that they can find a way in Islam, Allah is good and merciful, He
forgives everything, when you enter Islam you get clean, you begin from scratch.
Isn’t it wonderful? That’s Allah’s rahma (mercy), subhanahu wa ta’ala. Besides, our
beloved Rasul (prophet) shows you very well the path to follow, you can’t miss it.
Once you enter Islam there’s no turning back, the path is very clear (Dunia).
Sara is also very explicit in this regard:
I used to tell my parents “don’t you see that giving me this life has been a
tremendous mistake?” And they didn’t understand. I didn’t want to live. Now
everything, everything, looks different. My life is different (Sara).
Regarding the perceived marginality, and closely linked to this feeling of disenchant-
ment, we have observed that it can occur as a result of the feeling of being perceived as
“second-class” citizens. This perception is due to the effects that society and the devel-
opment of the interactions within it generate in the person. We include here the feeling
of being discriminated against by not being able to acquire the desired status or being
undervalued for possessing certain social, cultural, ethnic or religious characteristics. The
discourses of these women consistently reflect how they perceive this feeling of marginality
in the two main ways we have previously mentioned. However, some key excerpts reflect
this feeling in a particularly significant way.
In Spain I was doomed to be a fucking Moor, and in France, what can I say?
“Rebeu!” (verlanised form of beur, itself the verlan of arabe). My parents don’t
even live here, though, so who cares, they don’t even know, but people put
the label on you, just like that, that’s the harsh truth. That made me feel very
bad, as if I was less, I felt like a shit—pardon my French—not useful, not worth
anything, until I found the path of Allah, and now I even feel important, I feel
like someone. You could say that being on this path of being niqabi has even
raised my self-esteem (laughs) (Salima).
3.2. Cohesion
Regarding cohesion, and in relation to the previous section, it should be noted that
these niqabi women—or on their way to become niqabi—experience a profound am-
bivalence: on the one hand they experience a strong rejection outside the niqabi and
non-fundamentalist Islamic world, that is, in offline life in general; and on the other hand
they experience a strong group cohesion within the online community of Muslims in
which they move—especially in the Telegram channel to which they belong. Due to the
courage they show in publicly displaying themselves as niqabis, these women are adored
and admired in the groups in which they participate. However, in non-Muslim societies
or in Muslim communities that opt for a more moderate Islam, they are admonished,
discriminated against and even feared.
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I was recently told, by a brother in an Islamic chat room, “How brave you are!
Subhanallah (glory be to Allah). But I would not let my daughter do it if she
wanted to.” I know they want, many brothers and sisters would love to see the
niqab and feel it in their streets, but their imaan (faith) is very weak. However,
they like to see us, many are proud of us and support and encourage us (Melika).
As a result of their strong, intra-group cohesion, two phenomena stand out. The
first is that one can perceive what in social sciences is described as the “echo chamber
effect” [50] within this group. This effect refers to the metaphorical description of a situation
in which information, ideas or beliefs are amplified by transmission and repetition in a
“closed” system, where different or competing views are censored, forbidden, or minimally
represented. These women, after so much constant repetition of the same views, have
significantly reinforced their individual belief systems. Furthermore, this effect results in
a lack of critical view and attitude towards the group, as well as a lack of censorship of
behaviors or attitudes that fall within what they consider lawful. This is clearly reflected in
the following excerpt from the interview with Sara:
We help each other, together we reaffirm our beliefs and support each other
in not doing anything haram (unlawful). When one of the sisters doubts, or
myself, we support each other by reminding us of the way. Sometimes, Saytan
(Satan) whispers evil in our hearts through so many things . . . television, fashion,
everything. But we must continue strong in our din, in the way of Allah. We
refresh the precepts each other and, if one of us doubts, we give her extra doses
of Quran and Sunnah (laughs) (Sara).
The second phenomenon stemming from the strong intra-group cohesion and intrinsi-
cally related to the other phenomenon is the strong polarization of opinions that women in
the channel Orgullo niqabi share. They state that, before joining, their postures on the niqab
and other Islam-related issues were more “diffuse.” However, hearing their discourses, it
is clear that, after uniting, these women have converged towards a more extreme posture
on Islam.
Look, before sharing this space we were doing things just moderately well . . .
most of us were hesitant, especially about the niqab because, you know, we
payed too much attention to society and to our families, who tell you that this is
extreme or radical. However, we support each other here, we don’t feel weird
and nobody makes us think we’re crazy. In the channel we understand each
other, we encourage each other and we advance in the path of Allah, subhanahu
wa ta’ala, which is the most important thing. We practice more and more what
the Quran and the Sunnah say and we move away from the rest. There is no
interference here (laughs). Without my little sisters, I don’t know if I would have
had the strength to be a niqabi. I think a lot about it (Fatima).
Regarding this issue of social rejection, which the interviewees implicitly or explicitly
maintain throughout their discourses, these women talk also about the labor sphere,
assuming that they will not be hired because they are niqabis.
I know I’m not going to work, no matter how much I do, no matter how much
I am worth, no matter how much I study. No, niqab and work: impossible. It
hurts me, but this is what it is. The way of Allah is much more important. And I
choose Allah (Falak).
For her part, Zyneb expresses the rejection she experiences as follows:
I have even experienced my own sisters (she refers to other Muslim women)
rejecting me by calling me radical, telling me that I couldn’t go around like that.
I have experienced such thing even in my own family, even my parents don’t
understand or accept it. Fortunately, I have my sisters on Telegram, who fill me
with joy and encouragement and give me strength to continue on the straight
path (Zyneb).
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3.3. Cyber-Fundamentalism
The women under study are Muslims, as they state, but they are Muslims with
two particularities. The first is that the polarity—their extreme positions—we mentioned
before has led them to integrate fundamentalist Islam into their worldview. They reject
“enlightened” or moderate Islam because, as they often say, it did not “satiate” or “suffice”
them. Thus, together, they opted for what they consider “the straight path,” that is, the
path they consider adequate or correct within Islam: clearly, as we said, the fundamentalist
one. In this sense, Bourdieu [51] (p. 104) says that the variety of religions and of ways of
living them is part of a new field of struggles for the symbolic manipulation of behavior
in the private life and the orientation of the worldview, and all of them put into practice
antagonistic definitions of health, healing, and the care of body and soul. This idea is
reflected in the following excerpt:
There is only one Islam. I’m not going to criticize anyone, but my sisters already
know well what is halal (lawful) and what is haram and we all know that showing
off is haram. And Allah knows better. We know very well the rules from the
Quran and the Sunnah of our beloved Rasul, sallallahu alayhi wa sallam, and
our duty as Muslims is to comply with them. Moreover, when you comply you
are happy; when you don’t, you cannot live with guilt and discomfort. And so,
yes, niqab as Allah’s command (Yasmin).
The second particularity we mentioned is that their fundamentalist discourse and its
articulation has been constructed and constituted, literally, in the online world and in a
context derived from modernity. This is why, at the beginning of the article, we pointed
out that these women experience the niqab in a particular way. In fact we could say that,
without these tools provided by modernity—social networks such as Facebook, Instagram,
WhatsApp or Telegram—it is likely that this group of women would not exist. Likewise,
their discourse would not exist or, at least, it would not have been elaborated in the same
way, so particular, so structured. Therefore, modern!
I have received great support and ease from this group of sisters; they help me
a lot, they help me to be better, to practice each and every one of the teachings
of the Prophet, sallallahu alayhi wa sallam, which are within my reach as a
human being. I don’t know what would have become of my life without the
internet (laughs). And I tell you more: the only way to feel good, at peace with
yourself, is to do everything, everything, everything that Islam says, not skipping
anything. Alhamdulillah (all praise is due to Allah), the internet has given us
the opportunity to unite and to learn from each other, to teach each other. If
Allah wants something, so will be it, and He has given us modern technologies
to organize ourselves. Allah is great, my dear (Islam).
4. Discussion
We find ourselves living in a context derived from modernity in which the religious
sphere has clearly become “deinstitutionalized” and, as a consequence, it has produced
the emergence of new religiosities which offer diverse possibilities in terms of faith, from
creeds to models of spiritual behavior. Giddens [52–55] (p. 122) argues in one of his books
that we, as societies, have gone from having a “given” destiny in relation to God, nature,
etc.—meta-socially speaking—to having a socially-produced destiny, as a consequence of
the multiplication of the range of possibilities in the face of new uncertainties.
Within this context of non-permeability, mobility and change, faith is presented as a
rational and pragmatic choice: to be Muslim and, specifically, to be Muslim and also niqabi,
would be presented as an alternative within the melting pot of possibilities presented to
certain human beings. However, in some cases such as those shown in this article, that
choice is undoubtedly, significantly profound, given that it implies to renounce to things
from the most material sphere—such as opting for a job—to the most affective one—family
disruptions, in some cases. Such renunciations, which in the purest Weberian rational
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sense—in which cost–benefit calculations come into play—would be compensated by the
certainty and security that the fundamentalist ideology to which they decide to adhere and
which they in turn represent, clearly provides.
According to what the women under study have told us during the interviews, when
they decided to become niqabi they went from living in an uncertain and anomic world
to a world where each and every one of the questions they ask themselves, whether on
the material, spiritual and/or existential level, have closed and, above all, useful answers
for them, from a functionalist point of view. Thus, our first research question—whether
the existential unease has led these women to choose to be niqabi—would be substantially
resolved. We can now affirm that the women under study are niqabi because, behind their
worldview, there is a solid ideology that alleviates their existential unease, the constant
search for meaning that results from living in an anomic society.
With regard to the second question—whether their grouping has contributed to
some polarization—we find that this feeling of shared unease and, above all, having
overcome said unease together by their adherence to Islam, has served as a basis for these
women to connect and to create and/or participate in the channel. This participation has
polarized their behavior more and more towards the extreme, leading to the adoption of
a fundamentalist and homogeneous version of Islam, which has ended up in the use of
the niqab or contributed to its continued use. This would also answer the third question—
whether the polarization has given rise to or driven any particular ideology.
However, we have to clarify something: these women are not just fundamentalists,
but cyber-fundamentalists, given that both their discourses and their lives are grounded in
a context of modernity. In fact, many of these women claim to have lived a modern life
and to have suffered from the challenges of modernity itself as well as from its roots, such
as individualism or liquid relationships. These aspects of modern life dissatisfied them,
and even led some of them to depressive states, which made them find temporary refuge
in drugs, distant spiritualities or liquid religions—adapting Bauman’s [9] expression—
elaborated ad hoc as a remedy to survive, existentially speaking, the moment they were
living through.
Therefore, these women react to modernity from the fundamentalist precepts in which
they have polarized their perceptions, while they have deconstructed said precepts in the
very same modern context the react against. Thus, this version of fundamentalism that is
emerging, as well as its effective expansion and diffusion, are rooted in one of the great
enclaves of modernity: the non-space fruit of new technologies. This situation makes us
think that cyber-fundamentalism may be one of the many mutations of fundamentalism,
one that adapts itself, survives and stands as an existential possibility one can hold on to in
our times.
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